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Community Effects as a Factor in Corporate
Decisions Under Pennsylvania's New Business
Corporation Law: Objective Evidence of a
Subjective Process
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a new Business Corporation Law (hereinafter BCL) on November 16, 1988, which took effect October 1, 1989.' The sections of the new BCL governing the
standard of conduct for corporate directors are a re-enactment of
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8363 - 8365.2 Included in these sections
is a protective feature which allows corporate directors to take into
account the effect an act of the corporation will have upon a community when making corporate decisions.3 It is probable that a
shareholder suit against a director alleging improper conduct in
business decision making will be met with a defense claiming that
the decision resulted from the consideration of a community effect.
This comment proposes that an objective standard of evidence be
employed to test the existence and consideration of such a community effect when this factor is used to defend against a shareholder
suit alleging breach of duty by a corporate director.
The statute allowing corporate directors to consider community
effects was enacted in 1983;" at that time Pennsylvania joined a
small number of states which, by statute, allow corporate officials
to consider factors beyond shareholders' financial interests when
making business decisions.'
1. Pa. Act No. 1988-177; codified in Title 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § (Purdon Supp.
1990). Effective date of legislation appears in § 304 of Act 1988-177.
2. Pa. Act No. 1988-177, Source Notes, Purdon's Pa. Legislative Service, No. 8, March
1989, p. 1522.
3. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b)(Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(b)(Purdon Supp. 1990).
4. Pa. History of Senate Bills, 1983-84, at A-146. SB 1144, in its final form, was passed
by the house on December 13, 1983, concurred in by the Senate on December 14, 1983 and
approved by the Governor on December 23, 1983. Id. The section was originally codified at
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1408 (B) (Purdon Supp. 1984); it has been recodified twice: 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b)(Purdon Supp. 1987) and finally at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
511(b)(Purdon Supp. 1990).
5. Maine, Minnesota and Ohio also allow a corporate director to consider the "community" or "societal" impact of a corporate decision. See, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
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THE TRADITIONAL STANDARD

The traditional rule governing corporate decision making was
stated forcefully in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.6 : "A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders." 7 In 1952, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged this limitation on the discretion of corporate directors.8 Exceptions to this narrow scope of allowable corporate goals did exist;
for example, corporate philanthropy was allowed" and close corporations were often treated in a less strict manner than publicly
held corporations.10 In 1985, the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, when construing Pennsylvania
law in Enterra Corporationv. SGS Associates," held that management might properly consider the interests of suppliers, customers,
lenders and the stability of the company as well as shareholder interests. 2 However, no mention was made of considering the effect
of corporate action upon a community.
Proponents of the narrow scope of interests which can be considered when making business decisions argue that broader concerns
lead to inefficient and arbitrary decision making.1 3 This view "ignores the reality that other constituencies both share the risk and
are vital to the success of corporate activity."1 4 In Pennsylvania,
the proponents of the broader view have prevailed, as evidenced by
the legislation in question.
Pennsylvania follows the business judgment rule, by which a
court will not question the judgment employed in making a busi1701.59(E)(Page Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Title 13-A § 716(West Supp. 1989);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(West Supp. 1990). Missouri allows directors to consider such a
factor in the context of an attempted acquisition of the corporation. See, Mo. ANN. STAT. §
351.347(Vernon Supp. 1990).
6. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
7. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
8. Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Manufacturing Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295, 29
A.L.R. 2d 1256 (1952). Wherein the Court stated that a Board of Directors cannot authorize
a corporate act which they believe is in the best interests of the corporation when no quid
pro quo results. To allow this type of activity by the directors would open the door to dissipation of corporate assets in violation of the shareholders rights. Id., 87 A.2d at 297-98.
9. 15 P.S. § 1302(16)(Purdon 1967), now recodified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1502(a)(9)(Purdon Supp. 1990).
10. Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corporation, 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958).
11. 600 F.Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
12. Id. at 687.
13. Lipton, M., Corporate Governance in the age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1986), and authorities cited therein.
14. Id.
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ness decision."i Only when there is evidence that a corporate act
was arbitrary or done in bad faith will a Pennsylvania court intervene in the internal management decisions of a corporation.'
While courts will not examine the business decision itself, they
have examined the underpinnings of that decision, inquiring as to
the diligence, 17 potential for bias,"' and compliance with fiduciary
duty with which that decision is made. Courts of other jurisdictions have inquired as to the reasonableness of the decision to insure that directors have acted diligently.2"
It is clear that the business judgment rule protects the director
in exercising his judgment; it is also clear that a director has a duty
to be diligent and loyal to the corporation in the exercise of that
judgment. In Pennsylvania, a breach of those duties subjects a director to personal liability. 2 ' Now that the legislature has broadened the scope of interests which enter into business decisions, the
question to be decided is whether this broadening will be considered part of the exercise of judgment protected by the business
judgment rule, or an underpinning, similiar to diligence, which the
courts will scrutinize.
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE

The provision allowing corporate directors to consider commumity effects was first enacted as part of an anti-takeover statute
in 1983.22 Senate Bill 1144 was rushed through the General Assembly in response to corporate acquisitions occuring at that time in
Pennsylvania.23 Consequently, most of the debate centered on the
15. Selheimer v. Manganese Corporation of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
Pincus v. Mutual Assurance Co., 4 Pa. D.&C. 3d 71 (Phila. Cty. 1976), aff'd, 251 Pa. Super.
626, 381 A.2d 913 (1978).
16. Hopkins v. Union Canvas Goods Co., 104 Pa. Super. 264, 158 A. 301 (1932). MacAleer v. Sun Oil Co., 280 Pa. Super. 148, 421 A.2d 449 (1980).
17. Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 199 A. 345 (1938). Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
18. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
19. Id.
20. Cramer v. General Telephone & Electric Corporation, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 507 F.2d
759 (3d Cir. 1974); both applying New York law.
21. Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. 154, 420 A.2d 1078 (1980). See also, 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 512 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
22. Act 1983-92, P.L. 395, Laws of Pennsylvania, 1983, Acts and Miscellaneous Actions, at 395-99.
23. Pa. Legislative Journal, Senate, 1983, at 1430-31, 1436-37. See remarks of Senator
Zemprelli and the interrogation of Senator Fisher by Senator Zemprelli. Id.
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potential problems and benefits of the provisions regulating transactions involving changes in corporate control.2 4
Senator Fisher directly addressed the increase in decision making factors, remarking that it was a codification of existing law
which was meant to benefit shareholders as well as the members of
the enumerated classes, i.e., employees, suppliers, customers, and
communities.2 5 It is worth noting that Senator Fisher's statement
was offered in answer to Senator Zemprelli's remark that the bill
could protect poor management rather than benefitting shareholders.2 6 Other legislators commenting on Senate Bill 1144 emphasized the need for effective anti-takeover protection and did not
27
elaborate on the provision in question.
The House amended Senate Bill 1144 to extend the change of
corporate control protections to subsidiaries.2 8 No mention is made
in the House discussion of the community effects provision. When
the Senate considered the House amendment, concern was again
expressed that the bill should not benefit management at the expense of the shareholders.2 Ultimately the bill was passed in its
present form by an overwhelming majority. 30
In allowing corporate directors the freedom to consider additional factors when making business decisions the General Assembly did not provide statutory direction as to how the propriety of
such consideration would be measured in a court proceeding. What
little history exists indicates a legislative intent to benefit shareholders as well as the other corporate constituencies, not an intent
to protect poor corporate management. An objective standard of
evidence helps insure that the statute will operate to benefit the
classes the legislature sought to protect.
24. Id. at 1430-37.
25. Id. at 1434. Senator Fisher's statement emphasized that the statute was meant to
codify judicial interpretations of similar laws of other states to remove any doubt that such
actions were proper under Pennsylvania law. The consideration of such interests was meant
to benefit the corporation and shareholders as well as the other interests listed in the statute. Id.
26. Id. Senator Fisher's remarks appear at 1432-36. Senator Zemprelli's expression of
concern appears at 1430 and 1432. Senator Zemprelli apparently found the provisions applicable if a change of corporate control occurred objectionable, however, the community effects provision could also operate to protect poor management. Id.
27. Id. at 1431. Remarks of Senators Bell and Fumo. Id.
28. Pa. Legislative Journal, House, 1983 at 2129-30.
29. Pa. Legislative Journal, Senate, 1983 at 1523-24. The remarks of Senator Zemprelli. After consistently expressing reservations, Senator Zemprelli voted in favor of the
bill. Id.
30. Pa. History of Senate Bills, 1983-84 at A-146. The amended version passed by the
House by a vote of 192 to 3; the Senate concurred by a vote of 48 to 2. Id.
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The 1986 statute which repealed, re-enacted and recodified the
section allowing a corporate director to factor communtiy effects
into the business decision making process also created a new standard by which to judge the conduct of corporate directors." The
new standard substantially raises the burden on a shareholder attempting to have personal liability imposed on a director by requiring the challenged conduct to "constitute self-dealing, willful
misconduct or recklessness."3 The legislative history of this bill
deals mostly with the standard of conduct and does not directly
address the question of community effects. However, some of the
concerns raised in discussing the standard of conduct are equally
applicable to the community effects question.
House Bill 2072 had been unanimously passed by the House on
June 25, 1986; the Senate adopted amendments to the bill and
unanimously passed the amended version on September 30, 1986." 3
The first week of October was the occasion of substantial debate in
the House regarding the Senate amendments. Mr. Manderino, the
House Majority Leader, proposed amendments requiring the more
lenient standard to be adopted by shareholder vote and removing
corporate officers from the class of individuals protected by that
standard. 4
Especially pertinent to the community effects question is the
amendment requiring a shareholder vote before the more lenient
standard goes into effect. The discussion of the proposed amendment centered on preserving the control of shareholders over the
corporate directors. 36 Similarly here, requiring objective evidence
that a director has taken into account a factor such as community
effects, which is not directly related to the interests of the shareholders, furthers the purpose of providing the shareholders with a
measure of control over the directors they elect. Accountability is
preserved by not allowing the erection of a complete shield for the
directors against a shareholder action by a mere invocation of
"community effects" to justify any challenged business decision.
The legislative history of the amendment removing officers from
the class protected by the lenient standard also supports the re31.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
§ 512 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
32. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
33. Pa. History of House Bills, 1986, at A-292.
34. Pa. Legislative Journal, House, 1986, at 2036-40.
35. Id., at 2036-44.
CONS. STAT. ANN.
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quirement of objective evidence. This amendment was the more
hotly contested of the two. 6 Here rather than centering on protecting shareholder control, the discussion focused on assuring that
the shareholders would have a recovery from a corporate officer
personally for malfeasance and nonfeasance, rather than being
forced to recover from the corporation, in effect a recovery from
37
themselves.
Requiring objective evidence of the existence of a true community effect and a valid consideration of that effect by the directors
also furthers the purpose of assuring shareholders the recovery
from the responsible party personally, because objective evidence
is more susceptible to contradiction and challenge. Objective evidence helps insure the legitmacy of the defense if it is raised. The
directors are covered by a standard requiring recklessness or willful misconduct before personal liability attaches.3 Where no valid
community effect exists or where the directors have failed to act in
a diligent, reasonable manner in evaluating that effect, their conduct could be construed as reckless in that they disregarded shareholder interests. 9 Therefore, requiring objective evidence of a
community effects factor serves to give proper effect to the recklessness standard adopted for directors by allowing shareholders
some assurance that reckless decision making will not be protected
by a bald claim that community factors dictated the challenged
decision.
The legislative history of the new BCL does not directly address
the re-enacted sections in question. However, the legislative purpose discussed in that history also supports an objective rather
than subjective standard of evidence. The driving force behind the
36. Id., at 2036-53. This amendment was initially defeated but was later passed upon
reconsideration. Id.
37. Id., at 2040, remarks of Mr. Manderino. Id.
38. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
39. Recklessness has been defined as: "Rashness; heedlessness; wanton conduct. The
state of mind accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its probably or possibly
injurious consequences, or which, though forseeing such consequences, persists in spite of
such knowledge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th Ed., p. 1142. Pennsylvania Courts define it
similarly: Recklessness implies conscious appreciation of the probable extent of danger or
risk incident to a contemplated action. Reilly v. City of Philadelphia, 328 Pa.563, 568, 195
A. 897, 900 (1938). Willful misconduct conveys a like . . . meaning: willful misconduct
means that the actor desired to bring about the result that followed or at least that he was
aware that it was substantially certain to ensue. Goss v. Baltimore Ohio Co., 355 F.2d 649,
651(3d. Cir. 1966), citing Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 418 Pa. 567, 573-74, 212
A.2d 440, 443 (1965).
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new BCL was a desire to provide corporations with defensive
mechanisms against hostile takeovers. ° While the legislation does
in fact reduce some rights of shareholders by, for example, "reconfirming and expanding the abolition of the doctrine of de facto
mergers","1 the thrust of the legislation in general was to protect
corporations from hostile takeovers, not to insulate directors totally from liability when shareholders challenge their decisions.
Shareholder actions are not the type of activity which the new
BCL was meant to protect against.
IV.

OTHER AREAS WHERE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE IS USED TO SHOW
SUBJECTIVE STATE OF MIND

The process of making a business decision is a very subjective
one. The director's education, experience, intuition and a host of
other individual traits are part of that process. Directors are free to
employ those traits to assign weights to the various factors bearing
on the decision; however, they are not free to decide which factors
are to be considered. Pennsylvania has limited those factors by
statute. Therefore, an inquiry into which factors did, in fact, impact a decision is appropriate.
Courts use objective evidence to determine the true subjective
intent of an actor in a number of other situations. In the contract
area, the subjective intent of a party to the contract is determined
by that party's objective manifestations.4 2 Pennsylvania courts can
look at the surrounding circumstances, the object of the contract
and other extraneous objective evidence, as well as the personal
conduct of the contracting parties to determine intent."3 Due to
the difficulty of ascertaining a person's intent, a court will adopt
the most reasonable and practical interpretation of the parties'
conduct, which is objective evidence of that intent, when intent is
at issue in a contract case.""
Similarly, courts rely on objective evidence to determine subjective state of mind in the criminal area. Conduct of the actor and
the surrounding circumstances can be examined to determine
40. Pa. Legislative Journal, Senate, 1988, at 1671-72.
41. Pa. Act No. 1988-177, Headnote, Purdon's Pa. Legislative Service, No. 8, March,
1989, p.1211.
42. Ingrassia Construction Co. v. Walsh, 337 Pa. Super. 58, 486 A.2d 478 (1984). Mellon Bank NA v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980).
43. In Re Carter, 390 Pa. 365, 134 A.2d 908 (1957). Ziff v. H. Daroff & Sons, 357 Pa.
326, 53 A.2d 729 (1947). Hindman v. Farren, 353 Pa. 33, 44 A.2d 241 (1945).
44. Walton v. Philadelphia National Bank, 376 Pa. Super. 329, 545 A.2d 1383 (1988).
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whether the necessary criminal intent is present. 5 If a defense
based on a lack of criminal intent is to be successful, the actor's
belief in facts which exculpate the act must be bona fide and reasonable.4 6 A court can attribute that which a reasonable man
would have known to the actor."'
Objective evidence is also used to measure a subjective decision
in domicile cases. Where an individual has residences in two or
more states he can choose which residence will be his home, and so
choose in which state he will be domiciled. 8 In Pennsylvania,
courts will examine the person's conduct to determine which residence has, in fact, truly been chosen as the principal home despite
any self-serving statements of subjective intent the person makes."9
In the corporate area, courts in other states have treated the
business judgment rule as a presumption that a corporate director,
in making a business decision, acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and with the belief that the act was in the best interests of
the corporation." Courts have examined objective evidence when
determining if a director was truly acting on an informed basis.51
Here, where the list of what constitutes the best interests of the
corporation has been expanded, a court should examine objective
evidence to determine whether an appropriate interest actually exists and was considered.
V.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ACT

The Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act (hereinafter the
Act) further supports the adoption of a objective standard of evidence. The Act applies to every statute enacted on or after September 1, 1937; 2 the rules set forth therein govern statutory construction unless application of those rules "would result in a
construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General
Assembly. ' 53 Construction of the new BCL is clearly controlled by
the Act.
45. Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A. 2d 914 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 289 Pa. Super. 399, 433 A.2d 511 (1981).
46. Commonwealth v. Compel, 236 Pa. Super. 404, 344 A.2d 701 (1975).
47. Commonwealth v. McFarland, 226 Pa. Super. 138, 308 A.2d 126 (1973).
48. In Re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932).
49. Id.
50. Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984).
51. Id.
52. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1502(a)(1)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
53. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1901 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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Legislative intent controls the construction of a statute under

the Act.5 4 When determining legislative intent a court can consider
the following: the former law upon the same subject, 55 the objective to be attained 56 or the mischief to be remedied,"7 as well as
other matters.58 Additionally, a court may presume "that the General Assembly intends to favor the public interest as against any
private interest." 59 Statutes are to be liberally construed to effect
their objects and promote justice.6 0
Requiring an objective standard of evidence to prove a defense
based upon 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(b) follows the above
enumerated rules of construction. Former law in this area indicated a great reluctance to allow corporate directors total freedom
as to which goals were proper objects of corporate activity;6" an
objective standard serves this purpose. The new BCL was enacted
to remedy the susceptibility of Pennsylvania corporations to hostile takeovers;6 2 an objective standard does not prevent effectuation of this remedy. Nor does an objective standard prevent attainment of the legislative objective; 3 community effects may still be
factored into the corporate decision. In fact, an objective standard
may further the legislative objective by insuring that an in depth
examination of those effects by directors attempting to conform
their decision making activities to that standard.
A subjective standard would favor the private interest of directors by easing their burden when proving a defense based upon 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(b). While it is in the public interest to
have the effects of a corporate act upon the community at large
considered by the directors, it is also in the public interest to have
some degree of accountability on the part of those directors and to
provide aggrieved shareholders with some viable means of redress
personally against those directors for misconduct. An objective
standard of evidence favors these public interests over the private
interests as required by the Act.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(5) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
See supra, notes 6-10, and accompanying text.
See supra, notes 29-30, and accompanying text.
See text of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified
at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(b) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
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An objective standard of evidence is not a liberal construction of
the statute. However, by preventing the erection of an impenetrable shield to shareholder actions against directors based upon improper decision making, it does promote justice by holding directors liable for their misconduct.
Further support for an objective standard of evidence to measure § 511(b) defenses is found in the provisions of the Act requiring a statute to be construed so as to give effect to all its provisions, 6" and requiring related statutes to be construed in pari
5
6

materia.

Section 511 contains two other subsections." The first defines
the directors' fiduciary duties, including a duty of reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence. 7 The final subsection creates a presumption that actions by the directors are in the best interests of the
corporation; however, this presumption only arises in the absence
of any breach of the duties outlined in § 511(a).6 8
An objective standard of evidence gives effect to both of these
subsections. It facilitates measurement of the directors' performance by the fiduciary standard stated in § 511(a). It does not deny
effect to the presumption created by § 511(c), rather it examines
the breach of fiduciary duty which must be absent before the presumption arises.
The subchapter of the new BCL containing § 511 also contains
two other sections dealing with the personal liability of directors 9
and indemnification of directors by the corporation.70 The Act requires these sections to be construed together."
An objective standard for § 511(b) complements the requirements for personal liability outlined in § 512. Personal liability
arises if the director breaches his fiduciary duty.72 An objective

standard facilitates measurement of any breach of this duty be64.
65.
66.

1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1932 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
67. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(a) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(c) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
69. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
70. 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 8365 (Purdon Supp. 1989), now recodified at 15 PA. CON.
STAT. ANN. § 513 (Purdon Supp. 1990).

71.
72.

See supra, note 54 and accompanying text.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1990)
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cause objective evidence is more susceptible to challenge and
contradiction.
The final section in the subchapter governs indemnification and
provides that it is not available if the director has acted recklessly. 73 Failure to properly assess a community effect could consti-

tute reckless disregard of the interest of the shareholders. 74 An objective standard to measure this conduct helps to effectuate the
indemnification limitation.
The above reasoning indicates that this type of construction
would not be inconsistent with the intent of the General Assembly.
Therefore, the rules of construction should be applied to reach
such a result.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, courts have been loathe to question business decisions made by directors because they have been considered beyond
the usual scope of judicial expertise.75 Pennsylvania courts will not
substitute their judgment for that of the directors selected by the
shareholders. 7

However,

Pennsylvania

courts

will

examine

whether business judgment has been exercised in a reasonably diligent manner."
Decision making is a subjective process. However, the above examples show that a court can appropriately rely on objective evidence to determine subjective intent when required. The inquiry
advocated here does not require objective evidence of the propriety
of the decision reached; rather, all that would be required is objective evidence of the following elements:
(1) a valid community effect existed at the time the decision was made;
(2) the director(s) were aware of the impact the decision would have upon
the community;
(3) the decision is reasonably related to the interest claimed to have been
protected.

The first two elements are easily shown and would help to prevent a post facto claim of a community effect arising to defend a
claim by a shareholder. The final element admittedly comes close
to crossing the line into an examination of the propriety of the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 513 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
See supra, note 28 and accompanying text.
Shlensky v. Wright, 95 Ill.App.2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
Hornsby v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 72 A.2d 294 (1950).
Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 199 A. 345 (1938). Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.

Co., 61 F.Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
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decision itself. However, under the reckless, willful misconduct
standard required for personal liability by the statute, the court
will already be inquiring as to the reasonableness of a director's
conduct. It is but a small step to inquire into the reasonableness of
a director's decision as a manifestation of his conduct. The objective standard can further be justified as part of the court's inquiry
into the director's diligence.
The Pennsylvania Legislature has adopted the modern view that
a corporation has responsibilities beyond those that run to the financial well-being of its shareholders. By this statute, the interests
of those who rely upon, and contribute to, the corporation in a
manner other than ownership can be considered when decisions
which will have dramatic effects upon their lives are made. This is
a perceptive step forward which recognizes the inter-relationships
of modern economics. However, this step forward for non-ownership constituencies should not remove the accountability of the directors to the corporate owners. A requirement of objective evidence as to the existence and consideration of a valid community
effect when making a decision would go a long way towards reminding directors that, while consideration of the interests of
others is appropriate, their ultimate responsibility and overriding
duty lies with the interests of the corporate shareholders.
An objective standard of evidence is supported by the legislative
purpose revealed in the history of the statute. Use of such a standard in other areas of the law to show the subjective intent of a
party or actor is proof that such a standard is workable. The Statutory Construction Act supports such a requirement. It should be
the standard adopted for proof of any claimed defense arising
under 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(b).
David W. Thomas

